zontal context, where competitors acting in concert usually have common economic interests, to the vertical context, where the economic interests of the manufacturer and the vendor may conflict. Dr. Miles and its progeny, especially the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Colgate & Co.,8 attempt to distinguish conduct that may be easily distinguishable in theory, but not in practice . Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Ser- vice Corp. 9 is the Supreme Court's latest attempt to make coherent distinctions that provide some practical guidance to businesses and their counsel, to enforcement agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department, and to the courts.
Considerable attention had been focused on the pendency of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. The planned appearance of the United States as amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant, 10 and the congressional ire that resulted, highlighted the litigation. II In March, 1984 , the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Monsanto. The Court's opinion provides an opportunity to review the law and the policy of resale price maintenance, and-perhaps more importantly-to evaluate the legal standard now governing private litigation and federal enforcement in this area. In this article we will first review the historical development of the law of resale price maintenance; second, consider its policy ramifications; third, discuss the Monsanto case; and then conclude by examining the future implications for resale price maintenance. One of the central questions that invariably arises as a result of such analysis is 8. 250 U.S. 300 (1919) .
9. 104 S. Ct. 1464 Ct. (1984 . Monsanto Co. v . Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 Ct. , 1466 Ct. (1984 . See infra note 101. 11 . The appearance by the United States as amicus curiae on behalf of appellants provoked considerable criticism in Congress. As a result, an amendment, introduced by Senator Warren Rudman, 129 CONG. REC. S14,430 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1983) , was included in an appropriations act. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984 , Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071 , 1102 -03 (1983 . The amendment prohibited the use of the funds appropriated for the Department of Commerce and related agencies (including the FTC) and the Department of Justice and related agencies for "any activity, the purpose of which is to overturn or alter the per se prohibition on resale price maintenance in effect under Federal antitrust laws.
10.
... Id. Although the government's brief had been prepared and submitted prior to the adoption of the resolution, precluded then-Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter from addressing during oral argument before the Supreme Court the question of whether resale price maintenance should be evaluated under a rule of reason. See 129 CONG. REc. S 14,430-33 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1983 ) (remarks of Sens. Rudman, Weicker, Nunn and Kennedy). The Rudman provision has been interpreted narrowly to apply only to attempts to seek a reversal of the holdings of Dr. Miles and its progeny. See Presidential Statement on the Signing of H.R. 3222 into Law, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1619 (Nov. 28, 1983 ; Letter from Senator Warren Rudman to President Ronald Reagan (Nov. 29, 1983) (acknowledging the validity of President Reagan's interpretation of the provision). Pub. Law No. 98-166 governed appropriations for federal fiscal year ended September 30, 1984, and the succeeding legislation, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411, 98 Stat. 1545 (1984 , did not include a limitation similar to the Rudman provision.
whether the current per se prohibition against resale price maintenance should be discarded in favor of a rule of reason insofar as the latter allows for a factually based approach that can accomodate the many forms in which this antitrust issue arises.
I. THE HISTORY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
A. Dr. Miles and the "Demise" of the Colgate Doctrine.
Traditionally, most discussions of resale price maintenance begin with the 1911 Supreme Court decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons. 12 Dr. Miles Medical Company, a manufacturer of proprietary medicine, brought an equitable action seeking to enjoin the defendant wholesaler from obtaining a Dr. Miles product from authorized distributors for the purpose of resale at "cut prices." Under its distribution plan, the plaintiff and its authorized distributors had entered into contracts that established resale prices, and the case turned on the validity of those contracts. The Court proceeded to analyze the question by asking whether the restraint upon alienation was valid. It concluded that it was not. Acknowledging that restraints upon alienation are analyzed under a rule of reason, the Court stated that "agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void." 13 12. 220 U. S. 373 (1911) . In Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88 (1889) , the first case involving resale price maintenance reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court held that a requirement imposed by a manufacturer that his patent medicine not be sold below a stated minimum price was not unreasonable or invalid as a restraint of trade. In so doing, the Court stated that the "vendors were entitled to sell to the best advantage, and in so doing to exercise the right to preclude themselves from entering into competition with those who purchased, and to prevent competition between purchasers; and the purchasers were entitled to such protection as was reasonably necessary for their benefit." 131 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added).
In a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1908, the right to maintain resale prices with reference to copyrighted goods was denied. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) ; see also Scribner v. Straus, 210 U. S. 352, 354 (1908) (decided on jurisdictional grounds). The previous year, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in J. D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 35 (6th Cir. 1907) , had held that resale price maintenance was illegal under both the common law and the Sherman Act in the absence of evidence demonstrating the need for such a pricing policy. See T.
OVERSTREET, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 3 n. 1 (1984) ; see also E. SELIGMAN & R. LovE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE (1932) . Other early cases in this area include Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917) (the monopoly granted under the patent law cannot be used to control prices of patented articles after they have effectively been paid for), and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913) (a patentee may not limit the price at which future retail sales of the patented article can be made).
13. 220 U.S. at 408. The Court specifically rejected Dr. Miles's contention that minimal resale prices were needed to prevent erosion of its dealer organization as a result of price cutting. Id. at 407. Justice Holmes, in dissent, was concerned with the interbrand effects of the resale price prohibition: "I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by. . . permitting [retailers] to cut [Vol. 1984 [Vol. :1163 The Court's opinion in Dr. Miles rests upon its conclusion that the restraint upon alienation in question was unreasonable under common law principles. 14 Antitrust policy played a very minor role in the Court's decision.' 5 Indeed, the brief mention of the Sherman Act in the opinion is dictum. Thus, the antitrust significance of the Dr. Miles decision has been greatly overestimated by subsequent courts and commentators. 1 6 Supreme Court decisions following Dr. Miles have attempted to determine what type of conduct satisfies the concerted action requirement under the Sherman Act. These decisions, starting with the Colgate case, often rest on conduct that has economically ambiguous consequences and make distinctions that provide little practical guidance for future cases.
The Supreme Court appeared to carve out an exception to the Dr. Miles "rule" in United States v. Colgate & Co., 7 in which the Court addressed the lawfulness of Colgate's unilateral refusal to sell to distributors that did not honor resale prices set by Colgate. The government did not allege, nor did it introduce evidence to establish, that there were reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which . . . the public should be able to get." Id. at 412.
14. The Court stated: With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common law has been substantially modified in adaptation to modem conditions. But the public interest is still the first consideration. To sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable both with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, for the protection of the covenantee. Otherwise restraints of trade are void as against public policy.
The complainant's plan falls within the principle which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect, creates a combination for the prohibited purposes. No distinction can properly be made by reason of the particular character of the commodity in question. It is not entitled to special privilege or immunity. It is an article of commerce and the rules concerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply to it. Nor does the fact that the margin of freedom is reduced by the control of production make the protection of what remains, in such a case, a negligible matter. And where commodities have passed into the channels of trade and are owned by dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent competition and to maintain prices is not to be determined by the circumstance whether they were produced by several manufacturers or by one, or whether they were previously owned by one or by many. The complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic. Id. at 406, 408-09. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has interpreted Dr. Miles similarly. See [Current Comment-1969 -1983 . See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1980) ; infra note 106. 17. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). agreements obligating distributors to maintain the minimum prices set by Colgate. The Court dismissed the indictment, finding that no violation of section one of the Sherman Act was charged absent any allegation of illegal agreement:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. S. 85 (1920) . 21 . In so doing, the trial judge stated: Personally, and with all due respect, permit me to say that I can see no real difference upon the facts between the Dr. Miles Medical Co. Case and the Colgate Co. Case. The only difference is that in the former the arrangement for marketing its product was put in writing, whereas in the latter the wholesale and retail dealers observed the prices fixed by the vendor. This is a distinction without a difference. The tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is the equivalent for all practical purposes of an express agreement. ...
. . .Granting the fundamental proposition stated in the Colgate
Case, that the manufacturer has an undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal with any one who fails to maintain the same, or, as further stated, the [A]ct does not restrict the long-recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal, and that he of course may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell, it seems to me that it is a distinction without a difference to say that he may do so by the subterfuges and devices set forth in the opinion and not violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, yet if he had done the same thing in the form of a written agreement, adequate only to effectuate the same purpose, he would be guilty of a violation of the law. Manifestly, there-writing for the majority, attempted to harmonize Dr. Miles and Colgate by emphasizing that, as in the case of horizontal restraints, an agreement can be inferred from a course of dealing:
The court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of the opinion and judgment in [Colgate] . We had no intention to overrule or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., where the effort was to destroy the dealers' independent discretion through restrictive agreements. Under the interpretation adopted by the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, the indictment failed to charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either express or implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified resale prices; and it was treated "as alleging only recognition of the manufacturer's undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone who failed to maintain the same."
It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference between the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to observe them, and one where he enters into agreementswhether express or implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances-with all customers throughout the different States which undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices. In the first, the manufacturer but exercises his independent discretion concerning his customers and there is no contract or combination which imposes any limitation on the purchaser. In the second, the parties are combined through agreements designed to take away dealers' control of their own affairs and thereby destroy competition and restrain the free and natural flow of trade amongst the States. 22 The Court relied heavily upon its decision in Schrader's to affirm, one year later, the trial court's finding of treble damage liability in Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co. 23 Frey alleged that Cudahy, the manufacturer of "Old Dutch Cleanser," conspired with jobbers to maintain resale prices in violation of section one. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals-which reviewed the case after the Supreme Court's decision in Colgate but before its decision in Schrader's-reversed a jury verdict on the authority of the Supreme Court's decision in Colgate, concluding that " [t] here was no formal written or oral agreement with jobbers for the maintenance of prices." '24 In reversing the court of appeals' decision, Mr. Justice McReynolds wrote for the Supreme Court:
fore, the decision in the Dr. Miles Medical Case must rest upon some other ground than the mere fact that there were agreements between the manufacturer and the wholesalers. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183-84 (N.D. Ohio 1919), rev'd, 252 U.S. 85 (1920). 22 . 252 U.S. at 99-100 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29, 38-39 (1960) .
23. 256 U. S. 208 (1921) . 24. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Frey & Son, Inc., 261 F. 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1919 ), rep'd, 256 U.S. 208 (1921 It is unnecessary to repeat what we said in United States v. Colgate & Co. and United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc. Apparently the former case was misapprehended. The latter opinion distinctly stated that the essential agreement, combination or conspiracy might be implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances. Having regard to the course of dealing and all the pertinent facts disclosed by the present record, we think whether there existed an unlawful combination or agreement between the manufacturer and jobbers was a question for the jury to decide, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred when it held otherwise. 25 The Supreme Court attempted to delineate further the distinction between the Dr. Beech-Nut had adopted an elaborate system to maintain the resale prices of its food products. The company refused to sell its products to wholesalers or retailers that did not adhere to an announced schedule of resale prices; refused to sell to wholesalers that sold to retailers that discounted; reinstated a discounter after it gave Beech-Nut adequate assurances that it would adhere to the resale price policy; and implemented a detailed scheme that utilized code numbers on its products and reporting by cooperating wholesalers and retailers to detect violations of its resale policies. The FTC held that the so-called "Beech-Nut Plan" constituted an unfair method of competition within the meaning of section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 27 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this determination on the basis of Colgate. 28 After reviewing the Court's decisions in Dr. Miles, Colgate, Schrader's, and Cudahy Packing, Mr. Justice Day wrote for the Court:
By these decisions it is settled that in prosecutions under the Sherman Act a trader is not guilty of violating its terms who simply refuses to sell to others, and he may withhold his goods from those who will not sell them at the prices which he fixes for their resale. He may not, consistently with the [A]ct, go beyond the exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of interstate trade.
• . . The facts found show that the Beech-Nut system goes far beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices, which in the Colgate Case was held to be within the legal right of the producer. 25. 256 U.S. at 210. 26. 257 U.S. 441 (1922 ). 27. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 1 F.T.C. 516, 528 (1919 ), rev'd, 264 F.885 (2d Cir. 1920 ), rev'd, 257 U.S. 441 (1922 . 28. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885 (2d Cir. 1920 ), rev'd, 257 U.S. 441 (1922 .
• .. The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom of competition by methods in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and customers which are quite as effectual as agreements express or implied intended to accomplish the same purpose. By these methods the company, although selling its products at prices satisfactory to it, is enabled to prevent competition in their subsequent disposition by preventing all who do not sell at resale prices fixed by it from obtaining its goods. 29 Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals' reversal of the FTC's decision.
The Court's narrow reading of the Colgate decision in Beech-Nut was underscored in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,30 in which the Court focused on whether Bausch & Lomb and Soft-Lite, the sole purchaser of its pink-tinted lenses, had entered into illicit contracts, express or implied, to maintain the resale price of the lenses. Soft-Lite sought to control the retail price charged for the lenses through such means as granting retailer licenses only if retailers bought lenses from "licensed" Soft-Lite distributors and resold them at prevailing local prices; allowing its wholesalers to sell only to licensed retailers; and indicating to its licensed wholesalers by means of published price lists the prices to be received by them from licensed retailers. It enforced compliance with the license requirements through the use of a "Protection Certificate" that allowed the wholesale source of Soft-Lite lenses found in the hands of unlicensed retailers to be traced; through surveillance by SoftLite's salesmen; through exclusion from Soft-Lite's list of designated wholesalers if a wholesaler did business with unapproved retailers; and through cancellation of a retailer's license if the terms of the license were violated. The trial court found that Soft-Lite had conspired with its wholesalers and retailers in violation of section one. 3 1 Appellants, predictably, argued that on the basis of Colgate the trial court's finding of a conspiracy was in error. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Colgate did not involve, "as the present case does, an agreement between the seller and purchaser to maintain resale prices." '32 The Supreme Court also rejected appellants' reliance on Beech-Nut, recognizing that 29. 257 U.S. at 452-55 ; see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29, 42 (1960) ("However, because Beech-Nut's methods were as effective as agreements in producing the result that 'all who would deal in the company's products are constrained to sell at the suggested prices,' 257 U.S. at 455, the Court held that the securing of the customers' adherence by such methods constituted the creation of an unlawful combination to suppress price competition among the retailers.").
30. 321 U. S. 707 (1944) . 31. 45 F. Supp. 387, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) , affd, 321 U. S. 707 (1944 S. 29, 43 (1960) (noting that, after Beech-Nut, the Colgate doctrine meant "no more than that a single refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman Act").
34. 362 U. S. 29 (1960 vis products to the retailers, thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its suggested retail prices, Parke Davis created a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the Sherman Act. Although Parke Davis' originally announced wholesalers' policy would not under Colgate have violated the Sherman Act if its action thereunder was the simple refusal without more to deal with wholesalers who did not observe the wholesalers' [resale price schedule,] that entire policy was tainted with the "vice of illegality,"... when Parke Davis used it as the vehicle to gain the wholesalers' participation in the program to effectuate the retailers' adherence to the suggested retail prices. 35 Moreover, the Court found that by obtaining assurances of compliance from the retailers, Parke Davis effected the illicit combination:
[I]f a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to bring about general voluntary acquiescence which has the collateral effect of eliminating price competition, and takes affirmative action to achieve uniform adherence by inducing each customer to adhere to avoid such price competition, the customers' acquiescence is not then a matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the product. The product then comes packaged in a competition-free wrapping-a valuable feature in itself-by virtue of concerted action induced by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of the Co., 277 F.2d 787, 788-90 (2d Cir. 1960 T.C. 1016 (1976) (advisory opinion requested by the National Outerwear & Sportswear Association). However, use of coercive tactics that interfere with independent pricing decisions by dealers may result in a finding of a violation of section one. Although "exposition, persuasion or argument," see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 61, in an attempt to produce compliance with suggested prices is permissible, threats of sanctions for noncompliance, see, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 885 (8th Cir. 1979 ); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, [32] [33] , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1077 (1972) , or the use of sanctions, see, e.g., Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 644 n.5, 658 (5th Cir. 1975) , cert. denied, 424 U. S. 942 (1976) , or tactics such as enlisting customer aid in policing, see, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U. S. 127, 136-37, 142-43 (1966) ; Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 716, 719 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.) , aff 'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969) , are all violations of section one. Certain other conduct, such as requiring approval for deviations from list prices, responding with retaliatory wholesale price increases, placing dealers on probation, or using short-term leases and contracts, will likewise constitute a violation, see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 61-62. The FTC has taken the position that denial of cooperative advertising reimbursement to dealers for advertisements that do not conform to the manufacturer's suggested resale price constitutes unlawful vertical price fixing. See Statement of Policy Regarding Price Restrictions in Cooperative Advertising Programs, [Current Comment-1979 -1984 ] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 39,057 (Oct. 26, 1981) ; In re Totes, Inc., 96 F. T.C. 335, 338 (1980) . But see In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910, 914-17 (5th Cir. 1978 ) (not a per se violation of the Sherman Act). Because of the numerous restrictions imposed by decisions such as these on a manufacturer's right to terminate noncomplying vendors, it is generally acknowledged that Colgate has very limited utility as a guide to the implementation of a legal program of resale price maintenance. See ANTITRUST ADVISER § 2.31, at 132 (C. Hills ed. 2d ed. 1978); cf infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text. 39. 1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 278 (repealed by 1975 . See also T. OVER-STREET, supra note 12, at 4. [ Vol. 1984 Vol. :1163 the Miller-Tydings Amendment 42 to the Sherman Act. 43 One might question how the states could exempt resale price maintenance from the ambit of the Sherman Act after Dr. Miles and before the Miller-Tydings Amendment. There are two possible explanations. First, because the Dr. Miles decision rested on the common law of restraints on alienation, states could properly change that common law by statute. This explanation obviously assumes that the Sherman Act discussion in Dr. Miles was nothing more than dictum. 44 Second, whereas the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act is now held to be coextensive with the commerce powers under the Constitution, 45 the scope of those powers prior to the midtwentieth century were thought to be much more circumscribed. 46 Thus, it may have been thought that states could properly exempt intrastate sales without posing a direct challenge to the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 4 7 Many vendors enforced their price maintenance distribution policies against resalers with which they had no resale price maintenance agreements. These vendors argued that a contract containing a "nonsigner" clause valid under state law, when executed with one of their customers, would also cover customers with whom they had no such contracts.
Thus, a contract with one reseller would bind all resellers. 48 The No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936 . See generally Marvel, How Fair is Fair Trade? (1984) (unpublished manuscript; on file with the authors). Query, then, whether the National Association of Retail Druggists, which was instrumental in the adoption of both laws, saw the objectives of both to be related. Overstreet conjectures that both laws were enacted to protect high-cost distributors from price-cutting competition. See T. OVERSTREET Stat. ch. 278 , were largely ineffective because vendors who had not signed contracts with fair trade manufacturers nonetheless obtained the latter's products and resold them at prices below the fair trade price. Manufacturers attempted to prevent this by including a nonsigner clause, which bound all subsequent vendors to maintain a minimum resale price so long as at least one vendor in the chain of distribution had signed a contract agreeing to do so. See McLaughlin Dissertation, supra note 40, at 7.
49. 341 U. S. 384 (1951) . Maryland and Delaware distributors of liquor sought to enjoin a Louisiana retailer, who was not a party to the fair trade contract, from selling below the established bound under principal contracts. Thus, enforcement of resale price maintenance against nonsigners was not only unauthorized, but also illegal. In response to the Schwegmann decision, Congress in 1952 enacted the McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, which permitted manufacturers' sanctions against nonsigners of resale price maintenance agreements. , it is also true that there is nothing in the legislative history which indicates a congressional disposition to limit the power of the courts to continue, through interpretation, the evolution and adaptation of the Sherman Act in light of the continuing development of microeconomic analysis. Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,012 (footnote omitted). See also T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 8; Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 171, Amendment and the McGuire Act. Thus, today, the Sherman Act alone states the standard by which resale price maintenance is judged.
C. Permissible Alternatives to Resale Price Maintenance.
Faced with legal obstacles to resale price maintenance, companies desiring to police their customers' pricing policies employ other techniques. Vertical integration is an obvious example, but one that might be inefficient in many circumstances. 5 4 Vertical integration, assuming the absence of merger problems, eliminates the arguable presence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy because divisions of the same company and wholly-owned subsidiaries cannot conspire with each other. 5 5 When vertical integration is either inefficient or presents legal problems, a firm may employ sales on consignment as an alternative. Because the retailer does not have title in the goods and sells them as an agent for the manufacturer, there can be no conspiracy. In United States v. General Electric Co.,56 the Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that a seller who retained title to its products and consigned them to agents for sale at set prices employed illegal resale price maintenance. The Court observed that "genuine contracts of agency" are unobjectionable because the owner can properly fix the price at which his agents "transfer the title from him directly to such consumer. '57 In 1964, however, the Court reached a quite different conclusion in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. 5 8 There, the defendant's consignment of gasoline to independent dealers subject to a set retail price was found to be objectionable as an antitrust subterfuge. It must be noted, however, that the Court acknowledged that bona fide consignments might still be insulated from antitrust scrutiny. Because it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile the two decisions, 59 many have assumed that Simpson rejected, albeit sub silentio, the Court's earlier logic in General Electric. 60 This conclusion is given additional support by the fact that in 1973 the government successfully 54 challenged General Electric's consignment system-the very one previously held to be legal. 6 1 Nonetheless, many lower courts have continued to uphold the establishment of resale prices in the context of a bona fide consignment. 62 The enactment of state fair trade laws and the federal enabling legislation associated with them, taken together with consignment arrangements and the Colgate doctrine, indicate that the law has permitted resale price maintenance to exist in many contexts over the years. Since the Court's decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ,63 the availability of nonprice vertical restraints to accomplish many of the same objectives provides yet another illustration of judicial toleration of the practice. Although nonprice vertical restraints, such as customer or territorial restrictions, often have the same economic consequences as vertical price constraints, the Court in GTE Sylvania indicated that it would give nonprice vertical restraints more lenient scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis, by assessing their impact on intrabrand and interbrand competition. This approach has usually resulted in upholding the legality of nonprice vertical restraints. 64 Thus, the historical experience illustrates that the law has not been consistent in its treatment of resale price maintenance.
II. ANTITRUST POLICY AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Although economists have often observed that resale price maintenance might have procompetitive effects under certain circumstances, Professor Lester Telser rekindled the debate by posing the important question of why manufacturers would want to impose a policy of resale 61. United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1973 ). See generally DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 58 n. 400. 62. See, e.g., Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339, 341-43 (9th Cir. 1983 ); Harmick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 589 F.2d 806, , cert. denied, 444 U. S. 836 (1979); Pogue v. International Indus., 524 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1975 74-76, 84 (1977) . 63. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) . In Sylvania, the defendant granted a limited number of retail franchises and required each franchisee to sell only from the location at which it was franchised. Id. at The manufacturers' interest seems to be best served when distributors resell their products under such competitive conditions as may exist at the level of distribution and at the lowest prices resulting from that competition. If manufacturers set a floor to the resale price, then they also set a ceiling to their sales and thus apparently support a policy that runs counter to their own self-interest. Let the manufacturers fix a price at the factory gate at which all distributors may buy the product. Would not the manufacturers' sales and profits be greater the lower is the price at which distributors resell their products to customers? If so, then what explains the strong desire of some manufacturers to prevent distributors from reselling their product at prices below the level set by the manufacturers? 66 This question merits serious consideration. A desire to increase the resale price is no answer because a manufacturer could accomplish that simply by raising its price to its wholesale customers, and garner the higher revenues for itself. Generally, then, a manufacturer will benefit from keen competition among its resellers because it ensures the highest volume and the lowest distribution margin.
Professor Telser suggested two quite different reasons that might explain what appears to be perverse behavior by manufacturers: subsidizations of product-related services and maintenance of the optimum number of retail outlets. Both motives are legitimate, and neither pose an inevitable threat to consumer welfare. First, the volume of retail sales may depend on both the retail price and the product-related services pro- REV. 825, 832-43 (1955) .
Three conditions must be met for resale price maintenance to be in the manufacturer's best interest:
First, demand for the product must be a function of the service level as well as the price. Secondly, the service must be such that it is best provided by retailers, and not by the manufacturer. Finally, benefits from the service provision must not be fully appropriable by the providing retailer. If mere elevation of resale price were the purpose of [resale price maintenance], a manufacturer could achieve that result by raising its own price to the distributor and capture revenues commensurate with that higher price. Under resale price maintenance, he does not do that: he insists on a high retail price but permits the retailer to keep the revenues that derive from that higher price; and at the same time he accepts the consequence that a smaller quantity of his product will be sold because it is to be sold at a higher price. One cannot suppose that manufacturers, to their own detriment in terms of their sales volume, insist on conduct that can only fatten their distributors' profit margins and lessen their own. Plainly, manufacturers who wish to employ resale price maintenance, and who seek out distributors who are willing to enter contracts in which they promise to comply, have some other end in view. Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56, 007. vided by retailers. Absent resale price maintenance, one might expect to see different types of retailers providing different levels of services at different prices to consumers. Those customers who desire greater service would pay more, while those desiring less would pay less. This all works well unless some buyers, and their vendors, are able to "free ride" on the product-related services provided by others. 67 Although elimination of the "free ride" in the product services area is a plausible explanation of manufacturers' interest in resale price maintenance, some authorities dispute the reality of this concern. Federal Trade Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey has opined that the free-rider problem is like the Loch Ness Monster: nearly everyone has heard of it, but no one has ever really seen it.68 Perhaps the problem is rather that the practice is so usual and widespread that it goes unnoticed.
Consider, for example, the law student who has received a $500 wedding gift with which to purchase a stereo system. Student and spouse visit a specialty stereo store to investigate various equipment. The store is pleasant, well-appointed, and has good acoustics. Patrons can sit comfortably and listen to demonstrations of the store's products. The salesperson is knowledgeable about all of the store's wares, their features, and comparative values. Student and spouse indicate that they have $500 to spend, but are unsure whether to invest more in the amplifier than in speakers. Should they purchase a tape deck, or forego a tape deck at this time and buy a better grade turntable? And so on. The salesperson helps them test numerous combinations of components. Student and spouse try all the various possibilities-taking good notes all the while-and tentatively decide on an expensive amplifier, a moderately priced turntable, and inexpensive speakers. A tape deck will have to wait. They then indicate to the salesperson that they would like to think about it for a couple of hours, and inquire as to the store's closing time. Student and spouse thank the salesperson, leave, and race to a local discount store. The discount store has no amenities, no opportunity to test the merchandise, no knowledgeable sales personnel. Rather, student and spouse simply fill out an order form reflecting their selections from a catalog and hand it to the sales clerk. The goods arrive via conveyor belt from the second floor.
Loch Ness Monster? Rather obviously the hypothetical consumers and their discount store retailer take a "free ride" on the services provided by the initial retailer. This phenomenon has been appropriately [ Vol. 1984 Vol. :1163 described as the "browse here, buy there" strategy. 6 9 A manufacturer, confronted with facts similar to those described above, might want to impose resale price maintenance in an effort to insure the appropriate level of point-of-sale service. It should be noted that, under these conditions, resale price maintenance would be output-enhancing; a manufacturer must believe that the quantity sold will increase as a result of dealer-provided services; otherwise the manufacturer would not utilize resale price maintenance. Given these circumstances, resale price maintenance would not pose anticompetitive consequences and therefore should not be condemned under an antitrust rubric. 70 69. See Oster, supra note 65, at 61. The Antitrust Division has described this "browse here, buy there" strategy similarly:
[I]f some distributors are incurring costs by [providing point-of-sale services] and are selling at a higher price which cover [sic] those costs, while other distributors are not doing so and sell at lower retail prices, then the free rider phenomenon will appear. A substantial number of customers will go to the higher price outlet, will consume the time of sales personnel there to obtain the appropriate counseling, but will then leave without buying and purchase from a low cost outlet instead. It will prove to be impossible for some retailers to afford expensive point of sale services for which it is not practicable to impose a separate charge if other distributors are not doing so and are selling at prices which reflect the cost savings of not doing so. If the manufacturer is to be successful in controlling the manner in which his product is sold and the quality of point of sale services afforded in conjunction with the sale of his product, he must be able to shelter the gross margins of those distributors who are complying with his wishes from the pricing pressure of distributors who are not. Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,008.
A very real example of the "browse here, buy there" strategy appeared in Washingtonian magazine, where the practice of browsing through Washington, D.C. furniture showrooms but buying from North Carolina discount furniture merchants was described. Sullivan Concept. Price Fixing and Market Division, Pt. 11, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Rule of Reason]. Bork argued that, in order for a manufacturer to maximize its own output, it must not hinder competition among those who resell its products. Generally, resale restrictions are anticompetitive, and a rational manufacturer will never opt for them. Insofar as a manufacturer does impose such restrictions, it must be assumed that the goal is to increase output and so serve competitive goals that parallel the interests of consumers. Id. at 403. But Comanor observes: While consumer prices are generally increased through the imposition of these restraints, more services are also provided. As a result, the normative question of whether the additional services are worth the increased cost is not answered by a simple test dealing with the quantity sold of the manufactured product. Comanor, supra, at 10. Bork's critics question an assumption implicit in his analysis: that consumers who buy the product due to resale-price-maintenance-induced services are representative of all consumers who buy the product. If "marginal" consumers who will only buy the product when the services are included place a substantially higher value on those services than other consumers of the Vol. 1984 Vol. :1163 
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The other procompetitive explanation for the employment of resale price maintenance is its potential for assuring an efficient number of retail outlets. Theoretically, resale price maintenance would be utilized when additional outlets produce gains that exceed the costs of reduced demand resulting from the higher prices of protected resale margins.
1
The first necessary condition under this explanation is that there must be at least two types of retail establishments, each with a different cost structure. Second, availability of the product through a variety of retailers must induce more demand than the lower unprotected prices of fewer outlets. Third, each type of outlet must have customers who regularly patronize it as well as customers who price-shop. 72 Under these circumstances, higher-cost retailers would lose sales to those price sensitive customers who overlap both high-and low-cost sellers. If higher-cost sellers would lose sufficient numbers of customers to warrant dropping the product, a manufacturer would have an efficiency-enhancing rationale for employing resale price maintenance. In other words, resale price maintenance may be employed to purchase display space in higher-cost outlets. As Overstreet has observed, "an astute manufacturer will emproduct, then it is possible that welfare will be reduced when vertical restraints are added, and Bork's rule would not hold. The intuition behind this is clear. To induce services, vertical restraints must be added. These restraints theoretically could raise or lower the price to consumers. With an increase in price, there will be consumers who, like those who previously purchased the product without the service, will not be better off because they value the service at less than the price increase. For those that would buy the product only when service is included, they might value the service by more than the price increase. Depending on the size of the price increase, and on which group of consumers is larger, net aggregate welfare may either increase or decrease.
Professors Gould and Yamey have noted that if all or most manufacturers, in an effort to insure brand support, employ resale price maintenance, "the competitive sales-increasing effect would be neutralized; and, other things being equal, total sales would be smaller." Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L. J. 722, 724 (1967) . Thus, while the intent behind implementation of resale price maintenance might be output-enhancing, the net effect might be outputreducing. Comanor explains that "actions of individual firms depend on the slope and position of the relevant firm demand curves, while normative conclusions rest on market demand curves." Comanor, supra, at 12. Bork later agreed that a manufacturer employing resale price maintenance adds "to his manufactured article the information and promotion supplied by the reseller." Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L. J. 731, 733 (1967) . But he responded to Gould and Yamey's output restriction observation by stating that such a situation could not remain stable: some manufacturers will abandon the services in order to obtain greater profits. Id. at 734-35. For an interesting critique of Bork's response, see Comanor, supra, at 13-16. See also Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975 72. Sellers face a distinct demand curve absent customer overlap; in that situation one would not expect to find resale price maintenance. On the other hand, if all sellers had common customers they would face the same demand curve, and one would expect that customers would purchase at the lowest price. See T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 46. ploy [resale price maintenance] only when on balance the gains from wider distribution more than offset the effects of higher margains. ' '73 Of course, there are also anticompetitive explanations for resale price maintenance. Manufacturers can use resale price maintenance to police cheating by participants in a manufacturers' cartel. 74 The presence of a manufacturers' cartel does not necessarily dictate that resellers will employ uniform pricing. Where some retailers discount, it may simply reflect a local, individualized pricing policy harmless to the cartel; but, alternatively, it might indicate that the resellers' supplier has discounted to the reseller in violation of the illegal cartel agreement. Interpretation of retail discounting may be difficult, and while the imposition of resale price maintenance does not eliminate a cartel member's incentive to cheat, it does eliminate a variable that would otherwise complicate cartel surveillance.
Another improper use of resale price maintenance is as the "cat's paw" of a dealers' cartel. 75 Manufacturers may impose resale price maintenance in an effort to police cheating by recalcitrant cartel members. Manufacturers' agents or participating retailers could then monitor dealer adherence to the set price. Recalcitrant dealers can be disciplined by the manufacturer. Note that the manufacturer in this situation is coerced to establish and maintain as the set price the dealers' cartel monopoly prioe, rather than the price that yields the optimum distribution margin to the manufacturer. Overstreet aptly summarizes this scenario: "a detection and punishment mechanism, which it is hoped will deter price cutters, is set in place that uses the manufacturer (vertically) to police the [resale price maintenance] and stabilize the retailers' (horizontal) collusion." ' 76 There is some evidence of dealer utilization of resale price maintenance to enforce cartel behavior, but typically the resulting price maintenance policy does not serve the manufacturer's interests. 77 In any event, it is doubtful that resale price maintenance by a dealer 73 . Id. at 47; see also Gould & Preston, supra note 71, at 303-11.
74.
See, e-g., Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,009. See, eg., id. at 56,009-10. 76 . T. OVERSTREET, supra note 12, at 15. 77 . For example, in 1935 Pepsodent refused to "fair trade" its toothpaste. Angry California retailers organized a boycott of Pepsodent that almost completely eliminated Pepsodent sales in that state. Not surprisingly, the toothpaste company changed its policy and implemented fair trade; indeed, it issued a public apology to the retailers, and donated $25,000 to the organization that organized the boycott. cartel is commonplace. 78 From time to time observers focus on fact situations that do not seem to fit any of the proffered explanations for resale price maintenance. 79 The Levi Strauss case 80 is an often-cited example. 8 1 Indeed, one commentator has noted that resale price maintenance was not likely to have been in Levi Strauss's self-interest because the company seems to have fared better after it abandoned the policy. 82 However, it may be that what appears to be minimum resale price maintenance is really not that at all. Levi Strauss may have utilized maximum price setting in an effort to allocate a temporarily scarce product. Consider the following possible explanation. 83 During the relevant period, Levi Strauss faced an unanticipated demand for its product. While its traditional customers were in large measure blue collar, agricultural, and construction workers, blue denim had become de rigueur for large numbers of people who had not worn blue denim since childhood. Jeans, high heels, and silk blouses were in vogue at cocktail parties. Demand for this new "high fashion" product rapidly exceeded available supply. Increased supply was not feasible in the short run. The production of denim requires a substantial capital investment.
75.
Fashion is fickle. It was not at all clear that blue denim would continue to find favor with the quiche and camembert crowd. Naturally, there would be some reluctance to make the necessary investment when the increased demand might be very short term. When demand exceeds sup- [ Vol. 1984 Vol. :1163 ply, it is usual to permit the price mechanism to allocate the product to those who value it most. But Levi Strauss might have feared that allowing the price to be bid up would result in purchases by its new customers, with its old customers turning elsewhere, perhaps to khaki. In a year or two its new customers might have found their fashion elsewhere and-more importantly-its old customers might have transferred their loyalty to another product. Faced with this situation, might not Levi Strauss have employed maximum pricing as a temporary policy to allocate its product until the short-run increase in demand lapsed or until the necessary capital investment could be justified and the supply increased? Thus, what may appear to be minimum resale price maintenance may in fact be nothing more than a policy that is benign and not anticompetitive. 84 Yet another reason for manufacturers to enter into resale price maintenance programs is to obtain "quality certification" for their products. 85 Although there is some similarity to Professor Telser's classic "free rider" analysis, 86 the two scenarios are different. 87 Customers clearly regard some dealers as capable of certifying product quality; other dealers are less able to do so. Naturally, manufacturers prefer to see their merchandise sold in "leading stores" in order to obtain quality certification and thus increase demand for their product. 88 The sale of a 84. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145, 153 (1968) The Telser argument is that retailers are superior to manufacturers in providing services because they are capable of tailoring services to the particular needs of their customers. For example, the manufacturer of a personal computer could advertise the capabilities of its product and the requisite peripheral devices and software in general terms, but much of this information would be irrelevant to potential customers contemplating specialized uses, In contrast, the retailer could respond specifically to the user's needs. But to insure these services would be provided, the manufacturer would need to redirect competition among dealers from a price focus to a service focus. The remaining competition would nevertheless serve to prevent rents from being earned in equilibrium.
The quality certification argument presented here does not require that the services be tailored to particular customers. The quality signals provided by stores offering the product do not require additional efforts by firms beyond an investigation of whether the product in question is of a quality level consonant with the retailer's reputation. Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 79, at 7-8. 88 . Sale of a manufacturer's goods by stores of assured quality contributes to consumers' perception of the quality of the goods. This does not involve the services or facilities provided to the branded product to all types of dealers, however, provides some retailers an opportunity to free ride on those in the "leading stores" category. The solution is either to refuse to sell to discounters or to attempt to ensure the margin necessary to finance the desired ambiance. This explanation may have particular application to the apparel market. Unfortunately, the consumer welfare consequences of resale price maintenance in this setting are ambiguous.
Resale price maintenance can have both efficiency-enhancing and anticompetitive consequences, depending on the facts and circumstances. Recognition of the potential procompetitive effect of resale price maintenance is perhaps the most compelling argument for its treatment under the rule of reason. Of course some of the efficiency-enhancing attributes of resale price maintenance can be obtained by employing other vertical restraints, such as exclusive territories. That is not to say that other distribution policies are equally efficient substitutes. 89 Bork has observed that sellers will opt for resale price maintenance over locational restraints where the cost of shipment to the dealers' locations is low compared to the price of the goods. Exclusive territories, on the other hand, are attractive when transportation costs are large in relation to the total price of the product. 90 Thus, one would expect to see resale price maintenance with reference to watches, and exclusive territories for the sale of automobiles. 9 1
III. THE MONSANTO CASE
Monsanto, a herbicide manufacturer, held a fifteen percent market share in the late 1960's, while its principal competitor, Ciba-Geigy, possessed seventy percent of the market. 92 In an effort to increase its market share, Monsanto sought to educate its distributors and their customers consumer-pleasant changing rooms and patient sales personnel in the apparel trade, for examplebut is a less tangible indicia of quality. Ct. 1464 Ct. , 1466 Ct. (1984 .
about the merits of its herbicides. In 1967 the company changed its distribution policy and announced that distributors would be reappointed for only one-year terms. It predicated renewal on whether a distributor's primary line of business was the marketing of Monsanto's products to dealers and whether the distributor employed trained personnel capable of developing educational programs for dealers and their customers. These changes, together with the introduction of new products, seemed to produce results. Indeed, Monsanto's market share almost doubled during a four-year period. 93 The focus on point-of-sale education was apparently successful. In 1968 Monsanto informed Spray-Rite, a discount distributor of herbicide, that its contract would not be renewed. Approximately eighty percent of Spray-Rite's sales were of Ciba-Geigy herbicides, while only sixteen percent were of Monsanto products. Spray-Rite brought suit against Monsanto, alleging that Monsanto's decision not to renew the distributorship was based on a failure to abide by Monsanto's resale price maintenance policy, and that such a practice constituted vertical pricefixing under the Sherman Act. 94 The trial court instructed the jury that Monsanto's conduct was per se unlawful if it was in furtherance of a conspiracy to fix prices. The jury, in answer to special interrogatories, found that the termination was pursuant to a conspiracy between Monsanto and one or more of its distributors to set resale prices. 95 The jury award of $3.5 million in damages to Spray-Rite was trebled to $10.5 million. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 9 6 That court held that "proof of termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action. '97 As the Supreme Court later phrased the rule announced by the court of appeals, "an antitrust plaintiff can survive a motion for directed verdict if it shows that a manufacturer terminated a 93. Id. at 1467. 94. Id. 95 . The special interrogatories, to each of which the jury answered "yes," were as follows:
1. Was the decision by Monsanto not to offer a new contract to plaintiff for 1969 made by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy or combination with one or more of its distributors to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices of Monsanto herbicides? 2. Were the compensation programs and/or areas of primary responsibility, and/or shipping policy created by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices of Monsanto herbicides? 3. Did Monsanto conspire or combine with one or more of its distributors so that one or more of those distributors would limit plaintiffs access to Monsanto herbicides after 1968? Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d, 1226 , 1233 (7th Cir. 1982 , affid, 104 S. Ct. 1464 Ct. (1984 Ct. 1464 Ct. (1984 . The Department concluded that "the logic of Sylvania compels the conclusion that resale price maintenance-like other vertical restrictions-is unsuitable for per se treatment." Id. at 19. See also Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,012-13 (urging the Antitrust Division to seek judicial reconsideration of the per se rule against resale price maintenance). 
A. The Per Se Quality of Resale Price Maintenance.
Despite the arguments of the Antitrust Division in its briefs, the Supreme Court eschewed the opportunity to address squarely the per se issue. The Court, in a footnote, observed that the case did not present an "occasion to consider the merits of this argument." 1 0 3 The Court noted that neither party had argued the per se issue in the district court or raised it on appeal. Moreover, neither party pressed the argument advanced by the Antitrust Division in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court "declin[ed] to reach the question." 1°4 The Court, however, did accept the Antitrust Division's argument that the distinction reflected in the case law between price and nonprice restrictions does not make economic sense. 105 Despite some interpretations to the contrary, 10 6 Monsanto did not explicitly affirm the rule-if it can be called that-of The Monsanto Court, in affirming the vitality of the Colgate doctrine, 1 18 noted that a manufacturer often has a legitimate interest in the vertical restraints--contrary to Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977) and restrictive cooperative advertising programs-contrary to In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978) , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)-and to limit the consignment exception beyond Simpson v. Union Oil of California, 377 U. S. 13 (1964) .
114. Commissioner Pertschuk, writing for the Commission, found Colgate limited to the decision to sell to a particular customer in the first instance: "[W]e believe this right of initial customer selection is the meaning of Colgate as it stands today. . . . It does not mean that compliance with the pricing policy in order to avoid termination . . . does not give rise to an agreement." Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F. T.C. 1, 46-47 (1982) . The opinion made clear the Commission's view that unwilling compliance by dealers to adhere to a manufacturer's announced policy of price maintenance gives rise to an illicit agreement:
An announced policy of terminating noncomplying dealers, standing alone, does not automatically create a combination because such a policy standing alone does not necessarily imply any dealers act to avoid the carrying out of the threat. However, if, as is likely, some dealers do act to avoid termination, their unwilling compliance does give rise to combinations. In short, an announced policy of terminating dealers for noncompliance would not lead to agreements only if it had no effect in influencing dealer behavior, a principal reason for announcing the policy in the first place. Thus, an announced policy of terminating discounters, coupled with widespread compliance, with or without actual terminations, should be adequate to support an inference that there is unwilling compliance and, hence, that there are agreements. Id. at 40-41 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Chairman Miller dissented from the Commission's opinion in Russell Stover, 100 F. T.C. at 50-53. 115. Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983 ). 116. "If Colgate no longer stands for the proposition that a 'simple refusal to sell to customers who will not sell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman Act,'. .. it is for the Supreme Court, not this court, to so declare." Id. at 260.
117. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 Ct. , 1469 Ct. (1984 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Russell Stover was handed down on September 29, 1983; Monsanto was decided on March 20, 1984. 118. The Federal Trade Commission was severely criticized for its refusal to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari following the court of appeals' decision in Russell Stover. The critics contended that the Supreme Court would reverse the Eighth Circuit. See, e.g., Letter from price at which its goods are sold by dealers or distributors:
A manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons to exchange information about the prices and the reception of their products in the market. Moreover, it is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often costly nonprice restrictions that it will have the most interest in the distributors' resale prices. The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of the product, and will want to see that 'free-riders" do not interfere [citing Sylvania]. Thus, the manufacturer's strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily mean that it has done more than the Colgate doctrine allows.' 1 9 Given that the Supreme Court has characterized per se illegal conduct as "practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use," 20 treating resale price maintenance as per se illegal and, at the same time, recognizing a manufacturer's legitimate interest in resale prices is not wholly immune from criticism.
C. The Standard of Proof
One of the most important aspects of the Monsanto decision is the Court's discussion of what a plaintiff must show in order to establish the existence of concerted action and so avoid Colgate. The Seventh Circuit had held that "proof of termination following competitor complaints is Rep. James J. Florio to FTC Chairman James C. Miller, III (Dec. 2, 1983 ) (protesting that the Rudman amendment to the 1983 appropriations act affecting the FTC and the Justice Department, see supra note 11, was not a valid reason for refusing to appeal Russell Stover, because the case sought to "reconfirm" the FTC's "enforcement capability").
119. 104 S. Ct. at 1470 (emphasis added). Compare Baxter Letter, supra note 14, at 56,008: It is [the Antitrust Division's] judgment that manufacturers of certain types of products often have legitimate reasons for wishing to control the distribution environment in which those products are resold. If, for example, a product is technologically complex, its success in the marketplace may well depend upon the availability, at the point of sale, of technically trained sales personnel who are able both to instruct the consumer and to assist him in selecting the model, or the combination of components, that will best suit his individual needs. See also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. The Court's opinion in GTE Sylvania recognizes additional legitimate reasons, other than preventing the free rider effect, for a manufacturer to exert control over the manner in which its products are sold and serviced. Specifically, the Court mentions new market entry, Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) ; supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text, and manufacturers' safety and warranty obligations under state and federal law, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 n. 23. 120. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) . For a thorough discussion of the proper roles of the per se rule and the rule of reason in antitrust analysis, see Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124 , 1131 n.8, 1138 -40 (7th Cir. 1984 ). Vol. 1984 :1163 sufficient to support an inference of concerted action." 1 2 1 The Supreme Court rejected this standard but affirmed the judgment under a different standard. This new standard, however, was not clearly defined.
The Court made it clear that an antitrust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to prove the existence of an agreement, and cautioned that inferences of agreement must not be drawn from "highly ambiguous Thus, a manufacturer may act on dealer complaints in a reasonable and legal exercise of business judgment. 125 In the Court's words, "something more than evidence of complaints is needed." 126 There must also be evidence "that tends to exclude" the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors acted independently. 127 More specifically, the Court adopted the test employed by Judge Aldisert in Edward J Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc. : 128 "The antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that 121. Monsanto, 684 F.2d at 1238. The Supreme Court noted that the Seventh Circuit opinion, "later in the same paragraph, restated the standard of proof as follows: 'Proof of distributorship termination in response to competing distributors' complaints about the terminated distributor's pricing policies is sufficient to raise an inference of concerted action.'" Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1468 n.4 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that any difference in these formulations was of no importance in its analysis, id. Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text. 122. 104 S. Ct. at 1470 . 123. Id. (quoting Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168 , 1172 (8th Cir. 1982 ). 124 . Id. at 1470-71. 125 . "To bar a manufacturer from acting solely because the information upon which it acts originated as a price complaint would create an irrational dislocation in the market. In sum, '[to permit the inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints alone and thus to expose the defendant to treble damage liability would both inhibit management's exercise of independent business judgment and emasculate the terms of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) La. Oct. 3, 1984) , a district court found that, under Monsanto, complaints by distributors followed by a reduction in the discount rate given plaintiff was insufficient to establish a conspiracy.
127. 104 S. Ct. at 1471 . 128. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980 ), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981 .
the manufacturer and others 'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.' "129 In the context of the Monsanto case, the Court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have properly concluded that the defendant and some of its distributors had entered into an agreement sufficient to meet the contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement of section one of the Sherman Act. Most importantly, Monsanto had confronted a discounter and advised that termination would follow if the suggested resale price was ignored. When the discounter did not assent, Monsanto complained to the discounter's parent company which instructed its subsidiary to comply. Thereafter the discounter informed Monsanto that it would charge the suggested price. 130 The Court found that that evidence was both relevant and persuasive as to the agreement issue.' 3 ' However, that incident, involving another discounter, not Spray-Rite, occurred five months after Spray-Rite had been terminated. 132 Thus, the evidence did not go directly to the issue of the termination of Spray-Rite.
Even more questionable was the Court's focus on a newsletter prepared by a distributor for the dealers it served. The newsletter reported that Monsanto officials had stated in a meeting with distributors that the company wanted to "'get the market place in order' " and that, accordingly, " 'every effort [was going to] be made to maintain a minimum market price level.' 133 The Court observed that a jury might reasonably interpret the newsletter as referring to an agreement on the part of distributors and retailers to adhere to Monsanto's resale price maintenance scheme.1 34 On the other hand, a more reasonable interpretation of the newsletter is that it merely reports that Monsanto had a policy of sug-129. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1471 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3rd Cir. 1980 "In other words, we are assured that Monsanto's company-owned outlets will not retail at less than their suggested retail price to the trade as a whole. Furthermore, those of us on the distributor level are not likely to deviate downward on price to anyone as the idea is implied that doing this possibly could discolor the outlook for continuity as one of the approved distributors during the future upcoming seasons. So, none interested in the retention of this arrangement is likely to risk being deleted from this customer service opportunity. Also, so far as the national accounts are concerned, they are sure to recognize the desirability of retaining Monsanto's favor on a continuing basis by respecting the wisdom of participating in the suggested program in a manner assuring order on the retail level 'playground' throughout the entire country. It is elementary that harmony can only come from following the rules of the game and that in case of dispute, the decision of the umpire is final."
Id. at 1471-72. 134 . Id. at 1472.
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gested retail prices and that it would terminate dealers who did not follow those prices. Thus, it can be argued that the newsletter reflected only that Monsanto had adopted and implemented a Colgate policy. The Court then proceeded to discuss the nexus between evidence of an agreement with one or more distributors and the termination of Spray-Rite. The Court found that a jury could reasonably find the requisite connection since "it is necessary for competing distributors contemplating compliance with suggested prices to know that those who do not comply will be terminated."
135 Unfortunately, the rationale of the Court's conclusion is not self-evident. One might conclude that the Court held that proof of a nexus is unnecessary. However, the Court did find "some circumstantial evidence of such a link." 13 6 Following SprayRite's termination, there was a meeting between officials of Spray-Rite and Monsanto during which Monsanto's representative opened the conversation by stating that Monsanto had received many complaints with reference to Spray-Rite's pricing policy. Monsanto urged that the reference may have been to complaints by Monsanto's own employees rather than competing distributors. But the Court found that the choice between two reasonable interpretations of the testimony was one most properly for the jury. It should be noted that there was no direct evidence of complaints from competing distributors about Spray-Rite's pricing policies during the fifteen months prior to termination. 138 Nevertheless, the Court found that a jury properly could have found that there were in fact such complaints from evidence that they continued after 1968.139 It should also be noted that resale prices did not in fact stabilize as a result of Monsanto's policy. Evidently, discounting continued to characterize the industry. 140 Thus, the evidence of concerted action in Monsanto was speculative. The only direct evidence of an agreement to maintain retail prices occurred five months after Spray-Rite was terminated and involved Monsanto and another distributor. There was no direct evidence linking that agreement with the termination of Spray-Rite. The strongest evidence that Spray-Rite was terminated pursuant to such an agreement took the form of a post-termination comment by one of Monsanto's executives that Monsanto had received many complaints about Spray-Rite's pricing policies. There was no evidence that the complaints referred to were made by distributors rather than by Monsanto's employees. Moreover, even if there had been distributor complaints, there was no direct evidence of a causal link between the complaints and termination unless one assumes the governing legal principle to be post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
The evidentiary standard established by the Court is problematic. Its practical effect appears to be the same as that of the court of appeals' presumptive standard, which was explicitly rejected. 14 1 Although termination following dealer complaints-indeed, because of dealer complaints-is insufficient to permit an inference of illegal agreement, it appears that a triable issue can be generated with little more. The Supreme Court's opinion is, in this respect, schizophrenic. It acknowledges the legality-indeed, the propriety-of dealer complaints about discounters. It assumes that a manufacturer can act on such information and that such action does not itself give rise to an inference of an agreement. Yet, it seems to conclude that such evidence, when coupled with evidence of an agreement with unrelated distributors at a later period of time, is sufficient to establish both an agreement for purposes of the terminated dealer and a causal connection with the latter's termination. Counsel advising clients need to appreciate that the Court's treatment of the facts in Monsanto was inconsistent with the tenor of its rhetoric.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Monsanto is a significant decision.' 4 2 The Court implicitly refused to reaffirm the per se illegality of resale price maintenance, and thus in- 141 . See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. 142. Monsanto also must be assessed in terms of its implications for both public and private enforcement. The decision is not that significant in terms of federal enforcement standards, because there are few cases with sufficiently strong evidence of illegal resale price maintenance that can be brought by the FTC. The fact that the Commission felt a need to attempt to narrow the Colgate defense through Russell Stover is perhaps the strongest indication of this. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text. The vast majority of firms comply with the law and do not engage in practices that could easily be attacked as resale price maintenance. It would be surprising if it were otherwise. A firm cannot be expected to announce to its customers that it intends to violate a law which provides for treble damages and criminal sanctions. Moreover, manufacturers interested in resale price maintenance can obtain at least some of the benefits of the practice by employing nonprice restraints. Given the rule of reason analysis accorded nonprice vertical restraints under the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977) , firms typically utilize alternative modes of minimizing the free-rider problem. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Thus, the absence of large numbers of resale price maintenance enforcement actions does not necessarily mean that the law is not being enforced. Rather, it probably indicates that manufacturers are cognizant of the boundaries of permissible behavior and are acting accordingly.
A different set of circumstances characterizes private litigation, however, and in this arena the significance of Monsanto might well be great. Resale price maintenance claims typically accompany dealer termination litigation. Such suits are the traditional fare of private enforcement because the prospect of treble damages accompanied by attorney fees and costs are generally sufficient to interest a terminated dealer in raising any potential resale price maintenance issue. The existence of liberal [Vol. 1984 [Vol. :1163 vited future litigation to test that issue. 14 3 The Court also restored the luster to the Colgate doctrine. 144 This much is clear. Corp. v. Odom Corp., 703 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1983 ) (Nos. 81-6046 & 82-5241, reversing and remanding a case from the District of Arizona), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a memorandum from a terminated liquor distributor that focused on pricing reasons for its termination by the supplier, combined with a letter from a competing distributor offering to make a resale price commitment to the supplier in return for an exclusive distributorship, was circumstantial evidence of concerted action sufficient to withstand the supplier's motion for a directed verdict . See Buckingham Corp. v. Odom Corp., 1984- Apr. 2, 1984) . On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded it to the court of appeals for further consideration in light of Monsanto. Buckingham Corp. v. Odom Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1699 (1984 . The Ninth Circuit's decision remained unchanged in an unpublished order filed August 7, 1984. The supplier then petitioned for certiorari, 53 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1984) As the Court has recognized, sellers abiding by a resale price main-• tenance policy have a natural incentive to complain about competitors who do not. 49 And, again as the Court recognized, manufacturers, when confronted with information from complaining dealers, have an opportunity and a right to police their policy by terminating offending dealers.' 50 The Court in Monsanto requires something more in order to prove a section one violation. What the Court did not do was to flesh out the additional requirement. To permit weak evidence to suffice, as the Court did in Monsanto, is implicitly to undercut the Court's explicit discussion of the propriety of manufacturer action predicated on dealer complaints. It allows such action, if accompanied by virtually anything else, to give rise to a triable issue of fact. Monsanto is a decision at war with itself.
The Court's reaffirmance of Colgate and its treatment of the evidence of concerted activity also demonstrates the internal inconsistency of the Monsanto decision. On the one hand, Monsanto says that a manufacturer can announce its resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those refusing to comply. But, the Court then finds Monsanto's efforts to negotiate with its dealers with respect to adherence to that resale price and its threats to terminate dealers that did not comply to be evidence sufficient to support a finding of an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy. Taken at face value, the application of this evidentiary standard to the facts of Monsanto undercuts much of the Court's discussion of Colgate.' 5 ' As the Monsanto Court itself noted, "If an inference of [a price-fixing] agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded."' rick's recent decision in Computer Place, does provide some guidance as to the possible future effect of Monsanto. The plaintiff in Computer Place, a retailer selling principally by mail through one retail store, brought suit after the defendant manufacturer had determined not to provide mail order sellers with its new personal computer models. Plaintiff also sued another customer of defendant.
In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto several times. 155 Defendant, not surprisingly, made frequent mention of the "free rider" problem in support of its decision not to supply mail order vendors with the product.' 56 In support of its allegation of concerted action, plaintiff asserted that defendant retail competitor had complained about mail order discounting.' 57 The court, however, observed that such complaints-read properly-were nothing more than legitimate objections about mail order vendors benefiting from the support services of conventional retailers.' 58 Citing Monsanto, the court noted that such complaints were normal and to be anticipated; they hardly indicated concerted action.' 9 Indeed, the court stated: "Concern about the 'free riding' problem is a legitimate dealer complaint." 1 60 The court concluded that the manufacturer had demonstrated an independent reason why it was in its own best interest to adopt a different marketing strategy with reference to its new line of personal computers for which point-ofsale service was deemed important to overall sales volume. Thus, the plaintiff "failed to produce 'evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors acted Cal. Oct. 22, 1984 
independently.' ",161
A comparison between Monsanto and Computer Place illustrates the shortcomings of the current approach to the contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement. In both cases the manufacturer had an independent incentive to police its reselling program, i.e., elimination of the free rider problem. In Computer Place there was good evidence of nonterminated dealer complaints, indeed, much better evidence than in Monsanto. What then distinguished the two cases? Obviously one involved the refusal to provide a reseller with a particular product line, while the other was a more straightforward dealer termination case. But this distinction is not significant, because at the heart of both the refusalto-deal and the dealer termination cases is the allegation that the "terminated" dealer priced at other than the "right price." The operative distinction appears instead to be that the court in Computer Place concluded that the plaintiff had failed to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer had an independent reason for taking action. Is it simply, then, that in Computer Place the defendant's counsel focused on the "free rider" problem as evidence of an independent rationale for conduct, whereas in Monsanto defense counsel did not? Perhaps.
These two cases demonstrate the tension within the case law. The Monsanto principle employed in Computer Place-that plaintiff must exclude the possibility that the manufacturer has an independent reason for taking action-severely undercuts the conventional wisdom since manufacturers almost always have an independent reason-such as elimination of the "free rider" problem-for implementing and policing resale price maintenance.
1 62 Under this principle, resale price maintenance would be actionable only where such an incentive was absent, as in the case where it is imposed by a manufacturer at the behest of a cartel.' 63 161. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1471) . "Viewed in a light most favorable to [plaintiff] , the evidence shows that [defendants] were concerned about mail-order sellers. The concern demonstrated, however, was that mail-order sellers were taking advantage of and discouraging local dealers. The evidence also shows that the industry considered local dealer support essential to compete in the new personal computer market. Ore. Oct. 1, 1984) , which also relied heavily upon the Court's Monsanto decision. There, in addition to evidence of complaints to James Jeans's sale representatives from competitor retailers about plaintiff's discounting and evidence that plaintiff's account was terminated in response to these complaints (which the court acknowledged "would be insufficient alone to support an inference of conspiracy under Monsanto, " id. at 67, 208) , there was evidence that defendant had discussed plaintiff's pricing practices with one of plaintiff's competitors prior to plaintiff's termination and that the competitor had threatened to stop buying from defendant unless plaintiff was terminated. The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Significantly, no discussion of the free-rider effect or any other efficiency justification appeared in the court's opinion. But cf Burlington Coat Factory Ware-allow the continued bringing and litigation of cases that turn on insignifi- 167 . The Monsanto Court noted that the principal flaw in the evidentiary standard adopted by the court of appeals is that it undercuts the standards employed in Colgate and GTE Sylvania:
Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to per se treatment and treble damages. On a claim of concerted price-fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such an agreement. If an inference of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded.
The flaw in the evidentiary standard adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case is that it disregards this danger. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470. See also id. at 1468 n. 6. 168. 131 U.S. 88 (1889) , discussed supra note 12.
Monsanto is the product of a doctrine at war with itself. 169 Although Dr. Miles and Colgate can coexist peacefully in the theoretical realm, the pressures of business conducted in a competitive marketplace have turned that relationship into something less than harmonious. The Court in Monsanto was lulled by the security of judicial precedent but needled by the demands of economic reality. The Court refused to choose between the two, deferring that task to some future time. In so doing, it produced a decision of limited longevity, but considerable utility. Monsanto is noteworthy not so much for what it does today but for what it signals on the horizon for tomorrow. 169 . Doctrinal inconsistencies in other areas of antitrust law have suggested to other commentators the aptness of the metaphor of civil warfare. See, e.g., ACT xi (1962 & Supp. 1964 ). The phrase is equally descriptive of the past and present state of resale price maintenance.
